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Abstract
The distributed nature of organizational knowledge makes that knowledge sharing an important factor for unlocking its potential
value. In practice, however, people may have different motivations for not sharing knowledge with colleagues, which in part may
be due to the relational context. In this paper, we adopt Fiske’s Relational Model Theory to investigate relational dynamics in
knowledge sharing behavior. Our objective is to gain insight into how relational model conflicts affect knowledge sharing in
organizations.
A series of experiments have been conducted, in which the consequences of relational model conflicts for the willingness to
share knowledge are evaluated. Each experiment contained four scenarios reflecting different relational models. Participants were
faced with different scenarios reflecting particular relational models, and a fictitious other colleague who behaved according to a
conflicting relational model.
Our analysis shows that the recognition of relational model conflicts strongly depends on the relational models involved. The
extent of recognition seems to be related with the nature of the exchange relationships involved in the conflict. For instance, the
relational model conflict was more acutely felt by a communal sharing participant facing a market pricing colleague, than by the
same participant dealing with an authority ranking response. Likewise, we find that the impact of relational model conflicts on the
willingness to share knowledge depends on the relational models involved. Specifically, it appears that market pricing responses
have a negative influence on participants’ willingness to share, while communal sharing responses generally have positive effects.
Our research serves as a starting point for other studies aiming at a deeper understanding of the dynamics of knowledge
sharing behavior of employees and for solving conflicts at work.
1Relational Model Conflicts in Knowledge Sharing
Relations
I. INTRODUCTION
Extensive research exists on knowledge sharing in organi-
zations. Two main reasons are reported for this extraordinary
interest in knowledge sharing (Cabrera and Cabrera, 2002).
The first is the growing awareness that organizational knowl-
edge may constitute a strategic resource (Argote and Ingram,
2000). The second refers to the inherently distributed nature
of organizations (Tsoukas, 2003; Cabrera and Cabrera, 2002),
where knowledge sharing serves as a basis for collaboration
within organizations.
Knowledge sharing in organizations is not always a natural
phenomenon (Wasko and Faraj, 2005; Bock et al., 2005).
People may have different motivations for not sharing knowl-
edge with colleagues. For this reason, a lot of knowledge
management research has investigated the motivations for (not)
sharing knowledge. This research, however, usually does not
consider knowledge sharing in its relational context and often
assumes knowledge sharing relations to be static.
In this paper we adopt a dynamic, relational view on knowl-
edge sharing. We use Fiske’s Relational Model Theory (Fiske,
1991; 1992) to investigate relational dynamics in knowledge
sharing behavior. The aim of this paper is to contribute to a
relational and dynamic theory of knowledge sharing, based
on Relational Model Theory. The research question for this
present study is: how do relational models conflicts affect
knowledge sharing in organizations? To answer this question,
we developed an experimental research design that explores
the impact of conflicts in knowledge sharing relationships on
the willingness to share knowledge. Our basic premise is that
when relational models conflict, knowledge sharing will be
hampered.
This paper is organized as follows. First, we outline Fiske’s
Relational Model Theory and its relevance for understanding
knowledge sharing behavior. Then, we discuss how organi-
zational dynamics, e.g. conflicts, in knowledge sharing rela-
tionships influence the willingness to share knowledge. After
describing the research design, methods and data collection,
we finally discuss how our empirical findings contribute to a
relational and dynamic theory of knowledge sharing.
II. RELATED LITERATURE AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
A. Relational Model Theory and Knowledge Sharing
Knowledge sharing has been investigated from different
theoretical perspectives. One important perspective is con-
cerned with coordination modes. Davenport and Prusak (1998)
argue that knowledge should be shared according to the logic
of markets: ”Many knowledge management initiatives have
been based on the utopian assumption that knowledge moves
without friction or motivation force, that people will share
knowledge with no concern for what they gain or lose by
doing so” (p. 26). However, Constant et al. (1994) have
shown that this ’primitive’ self-interest and simple reciprocity
is influenced by organizational norms of knowledge owner-
ship. Others have accentuated the importance of community
exchange relationships for knowledge sharing, assuming that
people have common interests, needs, and practices (Brown
and Duguid, 1991; Huysman et al., 2003). Wasko and Faraj
(2005) showed that generalized reciprocity, community inter-
est, and prosocial behavior appear to be the main motivations
for knowledge sharing via electronic networks. Osterloh and
Frey (2000) argue that different motivations, intrinsic and ex-
trinsic, for knowledge sharing require different organizational
forms, which in turn enable different kinds of motivation and
knowledge. For example, markets use extrinsic incentives to
stimulate knowledge sharing. However, when extrinsic market
incentives are applied in community setting it may crowd out
the intrinsic motivations for knowledge sharing. These insights
are relevant for understanding the relational dynamics in
knowledge sharing behavior. Fiske’s Relational Model Theory
can help to gain more in-depth knowledge in these dynamics.
Relational Model Theory (RMT) argues that people are fun-
damentally social and that relations are patterns of coordina-
tion (Fiske, 1992). It further argues that all aspects of relations
are organized by just four elementary relational models or
schemata: communal sharing (CS), authority ranking (AR),
equality matching (EM) and market pricing (MP). Recently,
the theory has been applied to knowledge sharing relations
(Boer, 2005; Boer et al., 2011) aiming at understanding the
complexity and dynamics in knowledge sharing behavior.
Following is a summary of the relational models and their
implications for knowledge sharing behavior.
a) Communal Sharing: Communal sharing relations
(CS) are based on the conception of a bounded group of
people as equivalent and undifferentiated. In this kind of
relationship, members treat each other as the same, focusing
on commonalities and discarding distinct individual identities
(Fiske, 1992). The relationship is symmetric. Knowledge is
conceived as being a community good which no one owns
individually. Knowledge sharing is guided by generalized and
staggered exchange.
b) Authority Ranking: Authority ranking relations are
based on asymmetry among people who are linearly ordered
along some hierarchical social dimension (Fiske, 1992). Peo-
ple higher in rank have privileges, prestige, and have better
access to knowledge than people lower in rank (subordinates)
who are, in exchange, entitled to protection and pastoral
care. Information flows hierarchically and asymmetrically.
Knowledge sharing can be ’ordered’ by those higher in rank.
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(EM) are based on even balance and one-for-one correspon-
dence. People are primarily concerned about whether a rela-
tionship is balanced. known as balanced reciprocity, and keep
track of how far it is out of balance. Each person is entitled to
the same amount as each other person in the relationship, and
the direction and magnitude of an imbalance are meaningful
(Fiske, 1992). In EM relationships knowledge is perceived as
a means of leveling out knowledge sharing efforts.
d) Market Pricing: Market pricing relationships (MP)
are based on proportionality in social relationships. People
in market pricing relationships usually reduce all relevant
features under consideration to a singular value or utility
metric that allows the comparison of many, qualitatively and
quantitatively diverse factors. The relationship is organized
in terms of cost-benefit ratios and rational calculations of
efficiency or expected utility. Knowledge is perceived as a
commodity, which has a value and can be traded. People are
motivated to share knowledge according to market pricing
because they receive a reward for it, other than being similar
knowledge or any kind of intellectual reward (Boer et al.,
2011).
In the CS, EM, and MP relational models, relations are
symmetrical. In the AR model relations are vertical. For this
reason we distinguish between two sub models within the
Authority Ranking model: Authority ranking superior (AR1)
and Authority ranking subordinate (AR2).
TABLE I
STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES OF RELATIONAL MODELS (ADAPTED FROM
FISKE, 1991)
Relational model
Structural Communal Authority Equality Market
properties sharing ranking matching pricing
Perceived
ownership
owned by
community
owned by
supervisor
on behalf
organiza-
tion
owned by
individual
owned by
individual
Exchange
relationship
generalized
exchange:
people give
and take
what they
need from
pooled
resources
contractual,
direct
exchange
in-kind,
balanced
reciprocity
price, pay
for
commodity
in
proportion
to what is
achieved
Moral
judgment
caring,
kindness,
altruism,
generosity
what
supreme is
com-
manded is
right,
obedience
fairness as
strict
equality,
equal
treatment
abstract,
universal,
rational
principles
based on
utility
Motivation intrinsic,
intimacy
extrinsic,
power, care
desire for
equality
extrinsic,
achieve-
ment
B. Dynamics between Relational Models: conflicts, sacred
values, and taboo trade-offs
The four relational models are mutually exclusive because
of their different inherent structural properties (Fiske, 1992;
Boer et al., 2011). For example, knowledge cannot be shared
with the other person in return for money (MP) and by
promising something similar in return (EM) at the same time.
We assume that when people share similar relational models
knowledge sharing will take place. We label this as relational
model congruency, which is defined as the correspondence
between structural properties (Boer et al., 2011). Structural
properties refer to the perceived ownership of knowledge, the
exchange relationship, moral judgment, and motivations for
knowledge sharing (Boer et al., 2011). However, conflicts may
arise when structural properties are not congruent.
Poulsen (2005) distinguishes between between-model con-
flicts and within-model conflicts. Between-model conflicts
result from disagreement about the appropriateness of a
particular relational model for a particular situation. Each
relational model represents a qualitatively distinct form that
cannot be reduced to one of the three other models (Poulsen,
2005). The reason for this incommensurability is that rela-
tional models are rooted in different ’sacred values’, which
include the perceived ownership of knowledge, the type of
exchange relationship, moral judgment, and motivations for
sharing knowledge (adapted from Fiske, 1991, pp. 4248),
which can not be compared to each other nor can they be
converted to each other (Fiske, 1991; Tetlock et al., 2000).
For example, a conflict may arise when someone asks money
for advising a good friend: the friend assumes a communal
sharing relationship and does not expect that he has to pay
for the advice according to market pricing Boer et al. (2011).
In this case the ’sacred value’ of friendship is violated by the
MP model. Fiske and Tetlock (1997) call this situation a taboo
trade-off.
C. Hypotheses
Relational model conflicts are expected to affect the willing-
ness to share knowledge, depending on the relational models
involved. For instance, based on the structural properties in
table I and the design of the experiment, serious consequences
for knowledge sharing may be expect to occur when mar-
ket pricing responses are given to requests in organizational
contexts characterized by communal sharing. In the latter
context, exchange of knowledge is intrinsically motivated,
people give and take what they need from a common base
of resources, while exchange in a market pricing model is
extrinsically motivated. Also, an authority ranked supervisor
faced by a market pricing response by another colleague
may be expected to be less willing to share knowledge with
this colleague in the future. Further, when support requests
in organizations characterized by communal sharing, equality
matching or market pricing are met with authority motivated
denial, then adverse effects on people’s willingness to share
knowledge are expected, though for different reasons. For
instance, in a communal sharing context, where openness is
expected, the unwillingness of superiors to share knowledge,
3for the only reason they do not owe their subordinates any-
thing, may have negative consequences for knowledge sharing.
By contrast, organization contexts in which other colleagues
respond according to a subordinate authority ranking or a
communal sharing model, limited influence on knowledge
sharing is expected because relational models suggest an
intrinsic motivation to share. Table II provides a summary of
the expected consequences for knowledge sharing of relational
model conflicts.
TABLE II
EXPECTED CONSEQUENCES OF RELATIONAL MODEL CONFLICTS FOR
WILLINGNESS TO SHARE KNOWLEDGE
Participant’s Other colleague’s role (experiment)
scenario AR1 AR2 CS EM MP
AR1 O C CC
AR2 O O C
CS C O C CC
EM CC O O C
MP CC O O O/C
O= No relational model conflict expected, no influence
on willingness to share
O/C= Not clear whether a Relational Model conflict is
expected
C= Relational model conflict is expected, influence on
willingness to share
CC= Severe relational model conflict expected, severe
influence on willingness to share
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Experimental setup
We conducted five experiments, one for each relational
model (AR1, AR2, CS, EM, MP). The authority ranking model
has been split into an Authority ranking superior (AR1) model
and Authority ranking subordinate (AR2) model, as different
participant behavior may be expected depending on whether
the other in an authority ranking relation is ranked higher or
lower. All experiments situate knowledge sharing behavior in
an organizational setting. In each experiment, participants are
asked to reflect on three to four work-related scenario’s. These
scenarios allocate a specific relational model to the participant,
describe expected interactions and communications, a specific
need for assistance on behalf of the participant, and a response
to this need by a fictitious ’Other colleague’. The other
colleague’s response is based on the same relational model
for all scenario’s in the experiment, but always different from
the relational models adopted in the scenarios. The purpose of
this is to simulate a conflict, a situation in which there is no
reciprocity and thus no mutual use of one particular relational
model. An example of a particular scenario used in different
experiments is in the appendix.
B. Sample characteristics
After carefully reading the scenarios, participants were
asked about their attitudes towards the response of the other
colleague and about their willingness to share knowledge with
that other colleague in the future. All questions are formulated
as single item evaluative statements with five answer cate-
gories, varying from ’strongly disagree’ to ’strongly agree’.
In addition, information has been collected about gender,
age and education level of participants. Summary descriptives
of this information is in table III. A description of these
characteristics is in the analysis section.
TABLE III
DESCRIPTIVES OF THE FIVE SAMPLES
Other colleague’s role (experiment)
AR1 AR2 CS EM MP
Obs. 27 28 33 27 35
Gender Male 8 2 12 12 12
(29,63) (7,14) (36,36) (44,44) (34,29)
Female 19 26 21 15 23
(70,37) (92,86) (63,64) (55,56) (65,71)
Age < 25 7 10 17 17 16
(25,93) (35,71) (51,52) (62,96) (45,71)
≥ 25 20 18 16 10 19
(74,07) (64,29) (48,48) (37,04) (54,29)
Avg 27,56 25,68 24,45 25,56 36,66
Std (7,32) (4,72) (5,60) (9,11) (17,92)
Education Undergrad. 6 9 10 15 12
(22,22) (32,14) (30,30) (55,56) (34,29)
Graduate 19 18 16 9 19
(70,37) (64,29) (48,48) (33,33) (54,29)
Other 2 1 7 3 4
(7,41) (3,57) (21,21) (11,11) (11,43)
The columns denoted as ’Other colleague’s role’ provide summaries of the
different questionnaires. Each questionnaire assumes a particular role of
the fictitious ’other’ in the scenarios presented to the participant. Integer
values represent counts, with percentages below in parentheses. For age, the
frequencies of age classes below 25 and equal to or above 25 are given
together with its sample average and standard deviation (in parentheses).
C. Methods
Focus of the present analysis, is on participants’ perceptions
of the other’s response to their request for help and on the
consequences of relational model conflicts for the willingness
to share information with the other in the future. Anova tests
have been employed to evaluate within subject differences
between the scenarios of a given experiment, and to explore the
between subject differences of scenarios assuming the same
relational model across the experiments. Summaries of these
results are in table IV, while analysis of the outcomes is in
the analysis section.
IV. RESULTS
A. Experiment 1: AR1-responding other colleague
1) Participants and Design: The experiment with an AR1-
responding ’Other colleague’ has 27 participants. The majority
is female (19; 70,4%). Most participants are over 25 years
old (20; 74,1%; avg = 27,56, std = 7,32) and are university
graduates (19; 70,4%). Participants have been presented three
scenarios in which the presumed relational models were:
communal sharing (CS), equality matching (EM) and mar-
ket pricing (MP). In all scenario’s, the ’Other colleague’
responded in an AR1-manner to the participant’s request for
support. For this reason, the experiment does not contain AR1
or AR2 scenarios, which do not imply any relational model
conflicts.
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MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF PARTICIPANT’S REPLIES TO
VARIOUS SCENARIO’S
Participant’s Other colleague’s role (experiment)
scenario AR1 AR2 CS EM MP F
Participant’s surprise/disappointment about other’s response
AR1 1,73 2,00 3,86 29,77
(0,80) (1,0) (1,12) (0,00)
AR2 2,94 3,41 3,71 2,44
(1,06) (1,15) (1,13) (0,09)
CS 3,37 1,71 3,78 4,37 29,47
(1,18) (0,81) (1,19) (1,0) (0,00)
EM 3,56 2,36 2,00 3,94 18,04
(1,37) (1,25) (0,79) (1,03) (0,00)
MP 2,26 3,46 3,33 3,37 5,48
(1,23) (1,20) (1,31) (1,01) (0,00)
F (Scenario) 12,60 18,48 13,28 8,49 7,75
(0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00)
F (Id) 2,53 1,09 0,89 1,29 5,80
(0,00) (0,38) (0,63) (0,20) (0,00)
Willingness to share knowledge in the future
AR1 3,79 4,07 2,89 14,66
(0,78) (0,47) (0,90) (0,00)
AR2 3,94 4,07 3,74 1,08
(0,66) (0,62) (0,98) (0,34)
CS 3,26 4,36 3,70 3,14 14,41
(0,98) (0,73) (0,78) (1,09) (0,00)
EM 3,11 4,36 4,61 3,17 22,54
(0,93) (0,49) (0,75) (1,07) (0,00)
MP 3,63 4,29 3,85 4,26 6,64
(0,79) (0,46) (0,83) (0,53) (0,00)
F (Scenario) 3,18 0,16 17,81 7,13 0,50
(0,05) (0,86) (0,00) (0,00) (0,61)
F (Id) 2,08 1,21 2,92 1,77 2,05
(0,01) (0,27) (0,00) (0,03) (0,00)
The columns denoted as ’Other colleague’s role’ provide summaries of the
different questionnaires. Each questionnaire assumes a particular role of the
fictitious ’other’ in the scenarios presented to the participant. The results
represent averages and standard deviations (in parentheses) of respondents’
replies to questions about their surprise or disappointment about the other’s
response and about their willingness to share knowledge with the other in
the future. In all cases, five-point rating scales have been employed with
answer categories 1 = ’strongly disagree’ to 5 = ’strongly agree’. Moreover,
F (Scenario) and F (Id) are anova F-test results adopting a randomized block
design to evaluate the assumed equality of the mean scenario and participant
effects. F (Scenario) gives the outcome and significance (in parentheses) for
the Scenario effect, F (Id) gives the results for the participant effect. The
results in column F refer to between subjects anova F-tests (significance
values in parentheses) of the assumed equality of mean participant ratings
in a particular scenario across the experiments, i.e. the different responses of
the other colleague.
2) Results and Discussion: Results in table IV show that
mean participant scores of their recognition of a relational
model conflict (F (Scenario) = 12,60; p < 0,005) and of their
willingness to share knowledge in the future (F (Scenario) =
3,18; p= 0,05) differ significantly between scenarios. Partici-
pants in communal sharing or equality matching scenarios are
relatively disappointed with the authority-based refusal to an-
swer their support request. In spite of the differences between
the MP and AR1 relational models, participants in a market
pricing scenarios appear to be relatively less disappointed with
the other’s authoritative response. Participants in all scenarios
reveal a moderately positive willingness to share information
in the future. The relatively favorable willingness expressed
for the market pricing scenario is consistent with the low
disappointment about the supervisor’s response.
B. Experiment 2: AR2-responding other colleague
1) Participants and Design: The experiment with an AR2-
responding ’Other colleague’ has 28 participants, of which
only two are male (7,14%). Average age of the participants is
25,7 (std = 4,72), with 64,3% participants are over 25 years
old; 64,3% of the participants are university graduates. Similar
to the AR1-experiment, participants have been presented three
scenarios with relational models CS, EM and MP. The ’Other
colleague’ responds in an AR2-manner to the participant’s
request for support. As AR1 or AR2 scenarios would not
imply relational model conflicts, they were not included in
the experiment.
2) Results and Discussion: Even though the mean scores of
participants’ surprise with the other colleague’s response differ
significantly (F (Scenario) = 18,48; p < 0,005). The limited
surprise about the readiness of the other, a subordinate, to
help out, may well be explained by the fact that cooperative
behavior is expected. Yet, it is interesting to see, and consistent
with the structural properties of relational models, that in
a communal sharing context, with a natural inclination to
share, there is the least evidence of surprise (avg = 1,71; std
=0,81), while in a market pricing context, where knowledge
is considered individual property, there is more surprise.
Furthermore, there are no systematic differences between
the mean scores of the willingness to share knowledge in the
future (F (Scenario) = 0,16; p= 0,86), while the mean scores
themselves are all relatively high (> 4). These findings are
consistent with expectations stated in table II, based on the
argument that subordinates can be expected to share knowl-
edge, and that superiors can be expected to share knowledge
with them unless there are unforeseen reasons not to do so.
C. Experiment 3: CS-responding other colleague
1) Participants and Design: The experiment with a com-
munal sharing ’Other colleague’ has 33 participants. The
typical participant is female (21; 63,6%), around 24 years
of age (24,45; std = 5,60), and is a university graduate (16;
48,5%). Participants have been presented four scenarios with
relational models: AR1, AR2, EM and MP. Again, the CS-
scenario itself has not been included in the experiment, as it
does not constitute a relational model conflict.
2) Results and Discussion: Participants’ perceptions of the
willingness of the other colleague to answer their request
without reservation, are in line with their reactions to the
subordinate colleague’s response (AR1), which was expected.
Again, the mean surprise scores differ significantly between
scenarios (F (Scenario) = 13,28; p < 0,005). Mean surprise
scores are relatively low in the AR1-scenario (avg = 1,73, std
= 0,80) and EM-scenario (avg = 2,00; std = 0,79), but again
relatively high in the MP-scenario (avg = 3,33; std = 1,31).
Unlike the subordinate other colleague, the mean scores of
the willingness to share knowledge in the future do differ
significantly between the scenarios (F (Scenario) = 17,81;
p < 0,005). It seems that the other colleague’s CS-behavior
5is particularly appreciated in an EM-scenario, where the usual
exchange relation is based on balancing. The mean score for
the willingness to share knowledge in the future is relatively
high in this scenario (avg = 4,61; std = 0,75).
D. Experiment 4: EM-responding other colleague
1) Participants and Design: The experiment with an EM-
responding ’Other colleague’ has 22 participants. Somewhat
more than half of the participants is female (15; 55,56%), the
majority is below 25 years old (17; 63,0%; avg = 25,56, std
= 9,11), while 15 (55,6%) are undergraduate students. Partici-
pants have reflected on four scenarios with relational models:
AR1, AR2, CS and MP. The ’Other colleague’ responds in an
EM-manner to the participant’s request for support. The EM-
scenario itself has again been excluded from the experiment.
2) Results and Discussion: Both the mean scores of par-
ticipant’s attitudes toward the EM-responses (F (Scenario) =
8,49; p < 0,005) and of their willingness to share knowledge
in the future (F (Scenario) = 7,13; p < 0,005) differ signif-
icantly. Concerning their attitude toward the equality match-
ing response, participants in an authority ranking supervisor
model seem to be the least disappointed (avg = 2,00; std =
1,00), where those operating in a communal sharing context
are relatively negatively affected (avg = 3,78; std = 1,19).
The latter was expected, since in CS-scenarios resources are
exchanged freely. The former, more understanding, attitude in
the AR1-scenario was not expected. Possibly, participants did
not realize that the other colleague was not adopting the role of
subordinate, in which case the supervisor might expect to have
the desired support for free. In all scenarios, participants are
relatively positive about their willingness to share information
with the EM-colleague in the future. An exception is the
communal sharing context (avg = 3,70; std = 0,78), where
resources supposedly come from a shared pool.
E. Experiment 5: MP-responding other colleague
1) Participants and Design: The final experiment with
an MP-responding ’Other colleague’ has 35 participants. Of
these, 23 (65,71%) are female, 19 (45,71%) are aged over
25 (avg = 36,7, std = 17,92), while 19 (54,3%) are graduate
university students. Four scenarios have been presented to the
participants, expressing relational models: AR1, AR2, CS and
EM. The MP-scenario was not included, as it does not imply
a relational model conflict.
2) Results and Discussion: Mean scores of participants’
perceptions about the matched pricing model response of the
other colleague are significantly different between the various
scenarios (F (Scenario) = 7,25; p < 0,005). As expected,
participants in the communal sharing scenario are relatively
disappointed (avg = 4,37; std = 1,00) about the MP-response to
their support request. In a communal sharing model, resources
are shared without expecting anything in return. This is oppo-
site to market pricing model, which is extrinsically motivated,
based on compensation. The willingness to share knowledge
in the future does not differ significantly between scenarios
(F (Scenario) = 0,50; p < 0,61). Apart from the relatively
favorable willingness expressed in the AR2-scenario (avg =
3,74; std = 0,98), consistent with the subordinate’s role, the
mean scores are around or below a neutral position toward
sharing knowledge.
F. Meta-analysis
1) Participants and Design: So far, within subject attitudes
toward relational model conflicts between different scenarios
but the same response model of another colleagaue have
been analyzed. In addition, we explore the between subject
differences between different responses of the other colleague,
i.e. the different experiments, for a given relational model
scenario. All statistical tests are controlled for participant
characteristics, gender, age, and education. None of the control
variables had siginificant contributions, except gender in the
case of the market pricing scenarios.
2) Results and Discussion: Participants in all scenarios are
significantly affected by the other colleagues relation model.
Participants in an authority ranking supervisory role tend
to be the least surprised by the other collegues responses,
except for the matched pricing response (avg = 3,86; std
= 1,12). This attitude is mirrored by a relatively favorable
willingness to share information with communal sharing and
equality matching other colleagues, but a willingness to do
with the market pricing other (avg = 2,89; std = 0,90).
In AR2-scenarios, differences between the mean surprise
scores are barely significant (F = 2,44; p= 0,09), which may
have to do with the participants position in the organizational
hierarchy rather than the relational model. Consistent with the
outcome, the willingness in AR2-scenarios to share knowledge
in the future is generally favorable (mean scores varying from
3,74 to 4,07), but the mean scores do not differ significantly
(F = 1,08; p= 0,34).
Significantly different scores are observed for participants
in the communal sharing scenarios regarding the surprise
about the other colleague’s response (F = 29,47; p < 0,005)
and the subsequent consequence for the willingness to share
information in the future (F = 14,41; p < 0,005). Mean
surprise scores for AR2-responding other colleagues are rela-
tively low (avg = 1,71; std = 0,81), whereas those for market
pricing (avg = 1,71; std = 0,81) and, to lesser extent, equality
matching responses (avg = 4,37; std = 1,00) are relatively high.
The results are conform expected outcomes, as communal
sharing and subordinate have a similar attitude toward sharing
resources, while the intrinsic motivation toward sharing in CS-
relational models strongly contrasts with the compensation-
driven mode of the EM- and especially, the MP-relational
model. Parallel outcomes are observed for the willingness to
share, which shows the highest mean score for AR2-responses,
and a relatively low mean score for responses from a market
pricing model.
Participants in equality matching scenarios seem relatively
disappointed by the negative AR1 response of other colleagues
(avg = 3,56; std = 1,37), by are even more so by the market
price response (avg = 3,94; std = 1,03). Interestingly, the
cooperative responses by subordinate or communal sharing
colleagues are hardly considered surprising. Again, these re-
sults are mirrored in the mean willingness to share knowledge
6in the future, which is relatively high in the case of AR2-
and CS-responding other colleagues, but comparatively low
for AR1- and MP-responding others.
Lastly, participants in a market pricing scenario seem to
be least disappointed by the response of supervisors adopting
an authority ranking model (avg = 2,26; std = 1,23). These
participants are strongly in favor of future knowledge sharing
with subordinates (avg = 4,29; std = 0,46) and equality
matching others (avg = 4,26; std = 0,53).
V. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Knowledge sharing has been extensively studied in the
academic management literature. Many factors have been
identified that influence knowledge sharing behavior. Less
attention has been paid to the relational and dynamic nature
of knowledge sharing behavior. In this paper we built on
Fiske’s Relational Model Theory to provide a comprehensive
framework for studying these dynamics in knowledge sharing
behavior. Focus is on between-model conflicts and the impact
on the willingness to share knowledge.
A series of experiments have been conducted, in which
the consequences of relational model conflicts for the will-
ingness to share knowledge were evaluated. Each experiment
contained four scenarios reflecting different relational models,
but with a response of a fictitious other colleague adopting
a common, yet conflicting relational model. Our assumption
was that the extent of the relational model conflict adversely
affect the participant’s willingness to share knowledge with
the other colleague in the future. The experiments have led
to numerous findings, which for sake of exposition have been
captured under two broad headings: recognition of the conflict
and consequences of relational model conflicts for future
knowledge sharing.
First, the recognition of relational model conflicts strongly
depends on the relational models involved. A clear example are
the CS-experiments, in which participants with other relational
models, are seen to be hardly surprised about the communal
sharing type of response by the other colleague. Reversely,
communal sharing participants are acutely aware of relational
model conflicts when confronted with market pricing behavior.
A possible explanation is that the exchange relationship in the
communal sharing model makes that people do not imme-
diately expect anything in return for some action (staggered
exchange). Nor do they expect something in return from the
other with whom they shared their knowledge. Over time,
communal sharing actors expect something in return from
the community, but not not from specific individuals within
that community (generalized exchange). However, the fact that
conflicts are not or only limitedly recognized does not mean
there is no relational model conflict. On the contrary, relational
models do conflict with respect to their structural properties.
But as these properties include different time horizons and
specificities of the exchange relationship, conflicts may not im-
mediately become manifest. This also explains why conflicts
are commonly recognized when people are confronted with
market pricing responses. Actors exercising market pricing
behavior expect something in return for their contributions,
which is proportional to what has been shared, based on
rational calculations. Moreover, market pricing responses are
characterized by a direct exchange, which does not allow for
staggering of the return.
Second, the impact of relational model conflicts on future
knowledge sharing depends on the relational models involved.
Our general expectation is that relational model conflicts
negatively influence people’s willingness to share knowledge,
and the more so when the conflict is more strongly felt.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the lowest willingness to share
is observed for the MP-experiments, with market pricing
responding colleagues. This relational model is comparatively
concrete and specific. When confronted with market pricing
responses, other relational models may translate the unex-
pected response into less cooperative behavior in the future.
Consequently, the more severe the conflict, the lower the
willingness to share knowledge in the future. Moreover, con-
flicts with AR2- and EM-responding other colleagues are seen
to have limited or no negative effects on future willingness
to share. With regard to the AR2-experiments, this may be
explained by the fact that the authority ranking subordinate
is the asymmetrical counterpart of the general AR model,
which has limited meaning, in terms of conflicts, for the
other relational models. By contrast, the relatively positive
consequences future knowledge sharing following conflicts
with EM-responding other colleagues is surprising. Possibly,
the structural properties of equality matching relational model
compromises the structural properties of the other relational
models. Further research is needed to explore this unexpected
finding.
Our research serves as a starting point for other studies
aiming at a deeper understanding of the dynamics of knowl-
edge sharing behavior of employees and for solving conflicts
at work.
APPENDIX
Our experiments make use of questionnaires in which three
to four scenarios are presented to participants. In a given
questionnaire, the relational models expressed in the scenarios
differ (AR1, AR2, CS, EM, MP), but the response of the other
colleague is always consistent with one particular relational
model.
An example of a CS-scenario is the following:
You recently helped Pete, one of your colleagues, with a
large problem at work. Even though Pete is a colleague, you
have the feeling that you know him quite well and you consider
him as one of your friends. For this reason you feel it is
your duty to help him when a problem arises for which your
colleague needs your expertise regardless of the time or effort
it will take, it goes without saying. Out of a sudden one of your
own projects is facing serious problems. You do not know how
to solve it as it requires very specific knowledge, nevertheless,
you know that your colleague Pete has the knowledge and
experience to help you solve this problem. You ask Pete to
help you.
The other colleague’s responses to this support request
differed between the various experiments.
7In the AR2-experiment, the other responded in line with an
authority ranking (subordinate) model: Pete puts aside his own
work and helps you right away. Although he is willing to help
you until the problem is solved, he tells you that he hopes it
does not take too much time as he is extremely busy himself
at the moment. He is not even sure if he is able to finish his
own work on time.
In the AR1-experiment, the other responded in line with
an authority ranking (superior) model: Pete is not willing to
solve your problem himself. Instead, he gives you and two
other team members clear instructions that make the problem
less complex so that you and your team members can still
solve the problem on your own. Besides, he promises that in
case you are still not able to solve the problem, he is willing
to put more time and effort in helping you out.
In the EM-experiment, the other responded in line with
an equality matching model: At first, Pete puts a lot of time
and effort in solving your problem, though, after a while you
realize that he is less and less willing to assist you. This really
affects your problem in a negative way since you really depend
on Pete’s help. At a certain moment, Pete even tells you to
find someone else for a change as he has already helped you
enough for now.
In the MP-experiment, the other responded in line with an
matched pricing model: Pete says that solving this problem
costs him too much time and effort and even though it would
affect the overall company when the project fails, Pete is not
just willing to put his own work aside; this is not what he is
paid for. Unless . . . , you have a good offer for him.
In this particular example, the CS-experiment, with the
other colleague responding according to a communal sharing
relational model, does not have CS-scenario, as this would
not imply any relational model conflict. Likewise, none of the
experiments contains the scenarios that match with the other
colleague’s response.
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